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The German Headscarf Debate 
Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen*†
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly twenty years ago, teachers employed by the state in 
Germany began to wear the reddish-colored clothing of the 
Bhagwan (Osho) religious movement in obligatory state schools, 
thus silently yet highly visibly advertising for their religious 
community, which at that time was still considered a “youth sect” 
[Jugendsekte]. Many courts at the time prohibited this activity 
without much controversy.1 In contrast, with its Headscarf Decision2 
 * Professor von Campenhausen is a member of the Law Faculty of the University of 
Göttingen and specializes in public law, church law, church-state law, and foundation law 
[Stiftungsrecht]. This Article is reproduced in similar form in German in MATERIALDIENST DES 
KONFESSIONSKUNDLICHEN INSTITUTS IN BENSHEIM (Spring, 2004). 
 † Translated from German by John B. Fowles, B.A., Brigham Young University; 
M.St., University of Oxford; J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
  The following list of abbreviations provides the uniform abbreviation and the 
English approximation for each German legal periodical and other select sources cited in this 
Article. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BVerfGE Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts  
Decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court 
BVerwGE Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 
Decisions of the Federal Administrative 
Court 
DVBL. DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE GAZETTE 
EPD EVANGELISCHER PRESSEDIENST 
DOKUMENTATION  
PROTESTANT NEWS SERVICE 
DOCUMENTATION 
ESSGESPR. ESSENER GESPRÄCHE ZUM THEMA 
STAAT UND KIRCHE  
ESSEN DISCUSSIONS ON THE TOPIC OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 
GG GRUNDGESETZ  BASIC LAW (FEDERAL CONSTITUTION) 
JZ JURISTENZEITUNG JURIST’S JOURNAL 
KUR KIRCHE UND RECHT CHURCH AND LAW 
NJW NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 
NEW JURIDICAL WEEKLY 
NVWZ NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 
NEW JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
VBLBW VERWALTUNGSBLÄTTER FÜR 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG 
ADMINISTRATIVE GAZETTE FOR BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
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of September 24, 2003, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
has unleashed an avalanche of controversy; that is, the court has 
needlessly raised a difficult political dispute. Specifically, although the 
court ruled that a prohibition on a Muslim teacher from wearing a 
headscarf—which has previously been held valid3—is indeed 
theoretically permissible, the court nevertheless declared the specific 
legal regulation at issue insufficient4 and therefore mandated elected 
legislatures to create a “sufficiently clear legal basis”5 on which to 
justify such a limitation of religious freedom, yet provided them with 
no guidance in doing so. 
In Germany—a country largely unshaken by religious conflicts 
and where every individual enjoys full religious freedom under an 
overall satisfactorily functioning rule of law—the court has spoken in 
terms of religious freedom in the debate about the headscarf of a 
Muslim school teacher.6 In holding the administrative regulation 
ZBR ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
BEAMTENRECHT 
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW 
ZEVKR ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EVANGELISCHES 
KIRCHENRECHT 
JOURNAL OF PROTESTANT CHURCH LAW 
  1.  See, e.g., Oberverwaltungsgericht Hamburg [OVG Hamburg] [Hamburg High 
Administrative Court], NVWZ 1986, 406; Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof [Bay VGH] 
[Bavarian Court of Administrative Appeals], NVwZ 1986, 405; see also AXEL FRHR. VON 
CAMPENHAUSEN, STAATSKIRCHENRECHT [THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE] 72 (3d ed. 
1996) [hereinafter VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE]; 3 AXEL FRHR. VON 
CAMPENHAUSEN, GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR [COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC LAW] art. 136 
(Weimarer Reichsverfassung [WRV] [The Constitution of the Weimar Republic]) n.34 
(Mangoldt, Klein & Starck eds., 4th ed. 2001). 
 2. Kopftuch-Urteil [Headscarf Decision] (Sept. 24, 2003), BVerfGE 108, 282, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], NJW 56 (2003), 3111, 2 
BvR 1436/02, http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030603_2bvr143602.html. 
 3. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], NJW 55 
(2002), 3344 (upholding the administrative prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf in 
public state schools); Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg [VGH Baden-
Württemberg] [Baden-Württemberg Court of Administrative Appeals], NJW 54 (2001), 2899 
(upholding the administrative decision prohibiting teachers from wearing a headscarf while 
teaching). 
 4. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 49. 
 5. Id. 
 6. The headscarf problem can surface anywhere. For information concerning this issue 
in employment in the civil service (e.g., a school teacher), compare the situation in Germany, 
Oberverwaltungsgericht Lüneburg [VG Lüneburg] [Lüneburg High Administrative Court], 
ZEVKR 48 (2003), 219, and the decision below, Verwaltungsgericht Lüneburg [VG 
Lüneburg] [Lüneburg Administrative Trial Court], NJW 54 (2001), 767, with the situation in 
Switzerland, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, reported in German 
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prohibiting a Muslim school teacher, as a civil servant, from wearing 
a headscarf while teaching insufficient, the court nullified all related 
regulations immediately, with no transitional period.7 Now, laws in 
each of Germany’s sixteen federal states [Bundesländer or Länder] 
must be amended if a particular state’s law does not declare directly 
that the state [Bundesland or Land] prefers not to legislate on 
whether a Muslim teacher may or may not wear a headscarf while 
teaching, as in the case of the Land Northrhine-Westphalia.8 In 
response to the Headscarf Decision, the Länder Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony have already submitted or 
announced draft laws to provide a legal basis for prohibiting teachers 
from wearing headscarves while teaching. 
Prominent public figures—not jurists but experienced politicians 
who are also authorities on religion—have entered the constitutional 
fray, speaking against a prohibition on headscarves. For example, 
Hans Maier, the former Bavarian Minister of Education 
[Kultusminister], has supported the integration of Muslims in 
society through upbringing and education since the 1970s.9 In this 
effort, he has strived to promote dialogue in schools and colleges 
translation in Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte [EGMR] [European Court of 
Human Rights], NJW 54 (2001), 2871. For employment relationships outside of the civil 
service (e.g., a saleswoman), compare BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], NJW 56 (2003), 
2815, and the decision below, Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Employment Court], 
NJW 56 (2003), 1685, with Landesarbeitsgericht Hessen [LAG Hessen] [Hessen State 
Employment Court], NJW 54 (2001), 3650. For the issue of presenting personal identification 
documents with or without head coverings for both foreigners and German citizens, see 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof München [VGH München] [Munich Court of Administrative 
Appeals], NVWZ 2000, 952, and Verwaltungsgericht Berlin [VG Berlin] [Berlin Administrative 
Trial Court], NVWZ 1990, 100. 
 7. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (338), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 133 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 8. The Land Northrhine-Westphalia has expressly opted for a tolerant stance towards 
Muslim teachers wearing a headscarf while teaching. Mal Hü, mal Hott [First One Thing, Then 
Another], SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 3, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/ 
stadium/0,1518,268138,00.htm (on file with the BYU Law Review). That is, the Land has 
declined to legislate even though there are currently at least fifteen teachers in the Land who 
wear a headscarf while teaching. Id. The Land Minister of Education [Schulministerin], Ute 
Schäfer, a Social Democrat, has explained that wearing a headscarf while teaching has never led 
to a conflict within the school, stating that “this is a sign of the high degree of toleration of 
people in our Bundesland.” Id. (“Ich glaube, dass dies auch ein Zeichen der großen Toleranz 
der Menschen in unserem Bundesland ist.”). 
 9. Hans Maier, Editorial, Zwischen Kopftuch, Kita und Kreuz [Between Headscarf, 
Kippah and Crucifix], RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Jan. 8, 2004, at 26, available at 
http://www.merkur.de/archiv/neu/rm_0402/po/fdzindex.html. 
VCAM-FIN 7/3/2004 2:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
668 
 
between the “Children of Abraham”10 who, despite their common 
roots, are all so different from each other. That is why he could 
“only be horrified at this blind zeal”11 behind the drive for a renewed 
prohibition following the Headscarf Decision. Maier is against a 
renewed prohibition on headscarves because he fears the undesired 
consequences it would have for all religious symbols.12 According to 
Maier, nothing is as important as equality in a secular state.13 
Especially the younger generation of judges has learned this lesson, 
asserts Maier.14 Furthermore, much like the Federal Constitutional 
Court,15 Maier also pointed to the variety of interpretations of the 
headscarf: 
[T]he headscarf does not have one single interpretation; rather, it 
can mean many things (as it did until recently for our own mothers, 
grandmothers, and aunts!): it can be an expression of tradition, 
heritage, religious affiliation but also a sign of sexual unavailability, 
a freely chosen way . . . to lead a self-determined life without 
breaking with cultural heritage.16
Johannes Rau, the Federal President of Germany, has expressed a 
similar conclusion on the Headscarf Decision in public. First, the 
Federal President demanded in news interviews that the Islamic 
headscarf and a Christian amulet be treated equally as the Länder 
work out their new legislative schemes for prohibiting the headscarf 
following the Headscarf Decision.17 Then, using a celebration in 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; see also Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, Editorial, Noch einmal: das Kopftuch, 
RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Jan. 12, 2004, at 26, available at http://www.merkur.de/archiv/ 
neu/rm_0407/po/fdzindex.html. 
 12. Maier, supra note 9, at 26. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (298–99), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2 
BvR 1436/02, paras. 50–52. 
 16. Maier, supra note 9, at 26 (“Das Kopftuch ist nämlich nicht eindeutig, es kann für 
vieles stehen (wie es auch bei unseren Müttern, Großmüttern und Tanten vor kurzem noch für 
vieles stand!): Es kann ein Ausdruck für Tradition, Herkunft, religiöse Bindung sein aber auch 
ein Zeichen für sexuelle Nichtverfügbarkeit, ein frei gewähltes Mittel . . . , um ohne Bruch mit 
der Herkunftskultur ein selbstbestimmtes Leben zu führen.”) (omission in original). 
 17. See Interview with President Johannes Rau, BERLIN DIREKT (Television Station 
ZDF), Dec. 28. 2003, selections reprinted in EPD 4/2004, at 12 (on file with the BYU Law 
Review); Interview with President Johannes Rau, WELT AM SONNTAG [WORLD ON SUNDAY], 
Jan. 4, 2004, selections reprinted in EPD 4/2004, at 12–13 (on file with the BYU Law 
Review). 
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Wolfenbüttel of the 275th birthday of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing18 
as an occasion to reiterate his original demand, President Rau took 
the surprising approach of explaining that religious freedom is 
guaranteed to all Germans19—a proposition that does not seem to 
have been called into question.20 As had Maier, President Rau made 
 18. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81)—a thinker, author, and aesthete of the 
German Enlightenment—explored the brotherhood of man and the possible harmony of the 
three great religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in his last play, Nathan der Weise 
[Nathan the Wise] (1779), a “dramatic poem” expressing Lessing’s own “enlightened 
humanitarianism,” F.J. LAMPORT, GERMAN CLASSICAL DRAMA 64 (1990), and his concern 
with “the essential unity of all true religions and the falsity of religious bigotry,” id. at 69. 
Writing from Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the small German principality where he served as court 
librarian from 1770 until his death in 1781, Lessing wrote Nathan the Wise as a rejection of 
“literal obedience to the dictates of any religion, be it Christianity, Judaism, or Islam.” Id. at 
71. In this work, however, Lessing acknowledges that “an enlightened knowledge of the need 
for human brotherhood is not sufficient to bring such brotherhood about.” BENJAMIN 
BENNETT, MODERN DRAMA & GERMAN CLASSICISM: RENAISSANCE FROM LESSING TO 
BRECHT 82 (1979). Rather, deeds are needed. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, CONFLICT OF THE 
FACULTIES [DER STREIT DER FAKULTÄTEN] 71 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed., 1992) (1798) 
(“The only thing that matters in religion is deeds.”).  
 19. Johannes Rau, Speech in Wolfenbüttel on the 275th Birthday of Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing (Jan. 22, 2004), pt. V, para. 9 [hereinafter Speech in Wolfenbüttel], available at 
http://www.bundespraesident.de/top/dokumente/Rede/ix_94041.htm. 
 20. One of the most well-known aspects of Lessing’s Nathan the Wise is the famous 
“Ring Parable” [Ringparabel], which bears mention here because President Rau was alluding 
to its teachings on religious toleration by addressing the headscarf debate in a speech 
commemorating Lessing’s 275th birthday. In Nathan the Wise, a Christian Templar, Nathan 
the Jew, and the Muslim Sultan Saladin realize their familial relationship to each other. The 
“centerpiece” of this development is the Ring Parable. LAMPORT, supra note 18, at 70. 
Attempting to press Nathan the Jew into lending him money, Saladin the Sultan asks Nathan 
to tell him which religion is true because “[o]f these three Religions only one can be the true 
one.” GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING, NATHAN THE WISE, MINNA VON BARNHELM, AND 
OTHER PLAYS AND WRITINGS act 3, sc. 5, at 230 (Peter Demetz trans. & ed.), in 12 THE 
GERMAN LIBRARY (Volkmar Sander ed., 1991). Instead of answering the Sultan’s question 
directly, Nathan the Jew wisely relates the Ring Parable: 
In days of yore, there dwelt in eastern lands/ A man who had a ring of priceless 
worth/ Received from hands beloved. The stone it held,/ An opal, shed a hundred 
colors fair,/ And had the magic power that he who wore it,/ Trusting its strength, 
was loved of God and men./ No wonder therefore that this eastern man/ Would 
never cease to wear it; and took pains/ To keep it in his household for all time./ He 
left the ring to that one of his sons/ He loved the best; providing that in turn/ That 
son bequeath to his most favorite son/ The ring; and thus, regardless of his birth,/ 
The dearest son, by virtue of the ring,/ Should be the head, the prince of all his 
house. . . ./ At last this ring, passed on from son to son,/ Descended to a father of 
three sons;/ All three of whom were duly dutiful,/ All three of whom in 
consequence he needs/ Must love alike. . . ./ Then came the time/ For dying, and 
the loving father finds/ Himself embarrassed. . . ./ He sends/ In secret to a jeweler, 
of whom/ He orders two more rings, in pattern like/ His own, and bids him spare 
nor cost nor toil/ To make them in all points identical./ The jeweler succeeds. . . ./ 
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comments about possible interpretations of the headscarf, 
concluding that the possible misuse of an object cannot be allowed 
to inhibit its proper use.21 Above all, he rejected a perceived growing 
laicism that, in his opinion, resulted from a headscarf prohibition for 
teachers.22 On Lessing’s grave, President Rau called for toleration23 
and at the same time refuted the draft laws prepared in several 
Bundesländer prohibiting Muslim teachers from wearing the 
headscarf.24 In President Rau’s view, one cannot forbid one religious 
symbol and maintain the status quo for everything else:25 “That is 
not compatible with the religious freedom which our Basic Law 
guarantees all people and would therefore open the gate to a 
development that most proponents of a headscarf prohibition do not 
want.”26 In essence, the prohibition, according to President Rau, 
In glee and joy he calls his sons to him,/ Each by himself, confers on him his 
blessing—/ His ring as well—and dies. 
Id. act 3, sc. 7, at 231–32. After the death of the father, the three sons dispute among 
themselves who has the true ring, which makes its possessor beloved of God and men. Id. To 
resolve this conflict, the three brothers appear before a judge whom they ask to determine 
which brother has the true ring. Id. But to the surprise of the three brothers, the judge finds 
that “O then you are, all three, deceived deceivers,” on the basis that none of the brothers 
exhibits the type of moral action characteristic of the bearer of the true ring. Id. at 234. The 
judge does not leave it at that, however, and proposes a solution to the problem: 
Let each strive/ To match the rest in bringing to the fore/ The magic of the opal in 
his ring!/ Assist that power with all humility,/ With benefaction, hearty 
peacefulness,/ And with profound submission to God’s will!/ And when the magic 
powers of the stones/ Reveal themselves in children’s children’s children:/ I bid 
you, in a thousand thousand years,/ To stand again before this seat. 
Id. at 235. This exposition of the Ring Parable reveals President Rau’s misplaced agenda in 
using his speech honoring Lessing as an opportunity to enter the political fray of the headscarf 
debate. That is, an appeal to religious toleration on Lessing’s grave meant to reinforce the 
assertion that religious freedom is guaranteed to all in Germany does not address the real issue: 
whether a civil servant’s status as a representative of the state subjects the civil servant to 
demands of state neutrality in matters of religion at the expense of a certain degree of that civil 
servant’s constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom. See infra Parts II.C and III.B for a 
treatment of the dissent’s correct view in the Headscarf Case that a civil servant who 
voluntarily enters into this representative relationship with the state needs to be willing, in 
order to be qualified for the job, to relinquish some degree of religious freedom in the interest 
of the state’s religious neutrality.  
 21. Speech in Wolfenbüttel, supra note 19, pt. VIII, paras. 4–5. 
 22. Id. pt. XI, para. 5. 
 23. Id. pt. VI, para. 9. 
 24. Id. pt. III, para. 1. 
 25. Id. pt. XI, para. 4. 
 26. Id. 
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would cause an even clearer separation of church and state in 
Germany.27
A flood of academic treatments28 of the issue that cannot be 
overlooked suggests that foundational questions must first be 
debated before the headscarf prohibition can be enacted through 
 27. Id. pt. XI, para. 5. 
 28. See, e.g., Bertrams, Lehrerin mit Kopftuch? Islamismus des Grundgesetzes [Teacher 
with a Headscarf? The Islamism of the Basic Law], DVBL. 2003, 1225; Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, „Kopftuchstreit” auf dem richtigen Weg? [“Kopftuchstreit” in the Right Way?], 
NJW 54 (2001), 723; Debus, Machen Kleider wirklich Leute? – Warum der „Kopftuch-Streit” so 
„spannend” ist [Do Clothes Really Make the Person?—Why the “Kopftuch-Streit” is so “Exciting”], 
NVWZ 2001, 1355; Klaas Engelken, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 24.9.2003 
[Commentary on the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Sept. 24, 2003], DVBL. 
2003, 1539; Helmut Goerlich, Religionspolitische Distanz und kulturelle Vielfalt unter dem 
Regime des Art. 9 EMRK [Religio-politico Distance and Cultural Diversity Under the Regime of 
Art. 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights], NJW 54 (2001), 2862; Goos, Kruzifix 
und Kopftuch—Anmerkungen zur Religionsfreiheit von Lehrerinnen und Lehrern [Crucifix and 
Headscarf—Comments on the Religious Freedom of Teachers], ZBR 2003, 221; Halfmann, Der 
Streit um die „Lehrerin mit Kopftuch” [The Conflict Surrounding the “Teacher with a 
Headscarf”], NVWZ 2000, 862; Hans Michael Heinig & Martin Morlok, Von Schafen und 
Kopftüchern [Of Sheep and Headscarves], JZ 58 (2003), 777; Ipsen, Karlsruhe locuta, causa 
non finite, NVWZ 2003, 1210; Karl-Hermann Kästner, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG 
vom 24.9.2003 [Commentary on the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Sept. 24, 
2003], JZ 58 (2003), 1178; Sacksofsky, Die Kopftuch-Entscheidung—von der religiösen zur 
föderalen Vielfalt [The Headscarf Decision—from Religious to Federal Diversity], NJW 56 
(2003), 3297; Winter, Die Kopftuchentscheidung—Das Bundesverfassungsgerichtsurteil in der 
öffentlichen Debatte [The Headscarf Decision—The Federal Constitutional Court Decision in 
Public Debate], KUR 2003, 129; see also JEAND’HEUR & KORIOTH, GRUNDZÜGE DES 
STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS [PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH-STATE LAW] n.130 (2000); Jestaedt, 
Grundrechtsschutz vor staatlich aufgedrängter Ansicht. Das Kopftuch der Lehrerin als Exempel 
[Protection of Fundamental Rights Against State Imposed Beliefs. The Teacher’s Headscarf as an 
Example], in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JOSEPH LISTL 259 (1999); Karl-Hermann Kästner, Religiös 
akzentuierte Kleidung des Lehrpersonals staatlicher Schulen [Religiously Accentuated Clothing of 
the Teaching Staff at State Schools], in HECKEL FESTSCHRIFT 359 (1999); Karl-Hermann 
Kästner, Religiöse und weltanschauliche Bezüge in der staatlichen Schule [References to Religious 
and World Views at State Schools], in OPPERMANN FESTSCHRIFT 827 (2001); Korioth, 
Commentary on Art. 140 of the Basic Law and Art. 136 of the Weimar Constitution, in 
GRUNDGESETZ [BASIC LAW] marginal note 61 (Maunz & Dürig eds., 2003); Lothar Michael, 
Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerwG vom 4.7.2002 [Comments on the Federal Constitutional 
Court Decision of July 4, 2002], JZ 58 (2003) 256; Martin Morlok & Krüper, Auf dem Weg 
zum „forum neutrum”? – Die „Kopftuch-Entscheidung” des BVerwG [On the Way to the “Forum 
Neutrum”?—The “Headscarf Decision” of the Federal Constitutional Court], NJW 56 (2003), 
1020; Muckel, Gleicher Zugang zu jedem öffentlichen Amte – auch für muslimische Lehrerinnen 
mit Kopftuch? [Equal Access to Every Civil Office—Also for Muslim Teachers Wearing 
Headscarves?], in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CHRISTOPH LINK 331 (2003); Müller-Elschner, Zum 
Kopftuchstreit in Frankreich [On the Headscarf Debate in France], VBLBW 2003, 342; 
Thüsing, Vom Kopftuch als Angriff auf die Vertragsfreiheit [On the Headscarf as Attack on the 
Freedom of Contract], NJW 56 (2003), 405; Zacharias, Der Streit um das Kopftuch [The Debate 
About the Headscarf], KUR 2002, 115. 
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new laws in the Länder. Such high academic attention has not been 
forthcoming since the Crucifix Decision29 of the same court. But the 
new decision looks like it will be more readily accepted than was the 
Crucifix Decision.30 This Article examines some of these 
foundational questions, explaining why the basic reasoning of the 
majority opinion in the Headscarf Decision was significantly flawed. 
Part II critically discusses the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
Headscarf Decision. Part III first analyzes the reasoning of the 
majority opinion in holding the regulatory prohibition on wearing a 
headscarf while teaching insufficient, and then concludes that the 
dissenting opinion was correct in supporting the administrative 
prohibition. Part IV looks to the French approach to the headscarf 
problem, distinguishes it from the German situation and philosophy 
of church-state separation, and recommends distance from the 
French approach. Finally, Part V concludes that the Federal 
Constitutional Court failed in its Headscarf Decision to come to a 
solution for the problem of teachers wearing headscarves in public 
schools and that the issue will thus surely come before the court 
again in the near future. 
II. THE HEADSCARF DECISION 
A. The History of the Headscarf Decision 
The Headscarf Decision is the culmination of a six-year legal 
battle fought by a Muslim school teacher, Fereshta Ludin, for the 
right to wear her Islamic headscarf while teaching in a public school. 
Ludin was born in Afghanistan but has lived continuously in 
Germany since 1987, becoming a German citizen in 1995.31 In 
1997, as Ludin neared completion of her pedagogical studies in 
Stuttgart, the Stuttgart School Supervisory Authority [SSA] 
[Oberschulamt Stuttgart] turned down her application for a position 
 29. Kruzifix-Urteil [Crucifix Decision] (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE 93, 1. 
 30. For an overview of the Crucifix Decision, see VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF 
CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 64, 76 (listing relevant sources); see also Christoph Link, 
Der Streit um das Kreuz—Trendwende in der Rechtsprechung? [The Conflict Surrounding the 
Cross—A Reversal of the Trend in Caselaw?], KUR 2002, 101. For an American treatment of 
the case in English, see Lark E. Alloway, Comment, The Crucifix Case: Germany’s Everson v. 
Board of Education?, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 361 (1997). 
 31. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (284), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 2. 
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as a student teacher.32 The Land Minister of Education, Annette 
Schavan, a Christian Democrat, intervened on Ludin’s behalf in this 
instance to allow her to finish her studies.33 Upon completion of her 
studies in 1998, the Stuttgart SSA denied her application for 
employment in the state school system because of her “lack of 
personal qualifications.”34 Specifically, Ludin continued to insist on 
wearing a headscarf, even while teaching.35 On July 15, 1998, the 
parliament of Baden-Württemberg, the Land encompassing 
Stuttgart, expressly decided not to enact a general legislative 
prohibition on wearing a headscarf while teaching.36 Shortly 
thereafter, Ludin appealed the administrative denial of her 
application for employment, thus inaugurating her legal battle with 
Baden-Württemberg. 
Ludin’s case failed at all levels of administrative appeal: she 
would not be found eligible to teach in the public schools so long as 
she uncompromisingly refused to remove her headscarf while 
teaching. On August 14, 1998, Ludin made an internal appeal of the 
initial administrative denial of her application for employment to the 
SSA.37 She argued that “wearing a headscarf is not only a 
characteristic of her personality, but is also an expression of her 
religious conviction. According to the precepts of Islam, wearing a 
headscarf is part of her Islamic identity.”38 The SSA rejected this 
internal appeal on February 4, 1999.39 The SSA first reasoned that 
paragraph 3 of article 33 of the Basic Law40 indeed prohibited 
 32. Kopftuchstreit: Chronik der Ereignisse [Headscarf Debate: Sequence of Events], 
SPIEGEL ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518, 
266936,00.html [hereinafter Sequence of Events] (on file with the BYU Law Review). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (284), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 3 
(“mangelnder persönlicher Eignung”). 
 35. Sequence of Events, supra note 32. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (284), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 4 (“das 
Tragen des Kopftuchs sei nicht nur Merkmal ihrer Persönlichkeit, sondern auch Ausdruck ihrer 
religiösen Überzeugung. Nach den Vorschriften des Islam gehöre das Kopftuchtragen zu ihrer 
islamischen Identität.”). In the Headscarf Decision, the Federal Constitutional Court 
conveniently summarized all of the holdings below and serves as a reference to the holdings of 
the lower courts.  
 39. Sequence of Events, supra note 32. 
 40. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 33, para. 3, English translation available at 
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/germ/ggeng.html (“Enjoyment of civil and civic 
rights[,] eligibility for public office, and rights acquired in the public service are independent of 
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denying an employment application because of religious affiliation 
alone but then concluded that the same did not exclude the 
possibility of considering a lack of qualifications for working in the 
civil service based on an applicant’s religion.41 The SSA then 
admitted that wearing a headscarf fell within the protections of 
article 4 of the Basic Law42 but based its denial of her application on 
the idea that “[t]he religious freedom of the complainant is limited 
by the fundamental right of the students to negative religious 
freedom, the parent’s right of upbringing from paragraph 2 of article 
6, as well as by the state’s obligation to religious and worldview 
neutrality.”43
Ludin appealed this SSA decision to the Stuttgart Administrative 
Court, which rejected her complaint on March 24, 2000. The 
Stuttgart Administrative Court held that “[w]earing a headscarf for 
religious reasons by a teacher constituted a lack of qualification in 
the sense of section 11, paragraph 1 of the Baden-Württemberg’s 
Law on State Civil Servants” because of the interplay between the 
teacher’s religious freedom and the neutrality of the state, on the one 
hand, and the rights of the students and parents on the other.44  
Next, Ludin appealed this rejection of her complaint to the 
Baden-Württemberg Court of Administrative Appeals, the Land 
administrative appellate court, which upheld the Stuttgart 
Administrative Court’s denial of Ludin’s complaint on June 26, 
2001.45 The Court of Administrative Appeals pointed out that an 
religious denomination. No one may suffer disadvantage by reason of his adherence or non-
adherence to a denomination or ideology.”). 
 41. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (285), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 5. 
 42. Article 4 of the Basic Law provides that 
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed religious or ideological, are 
inviolable. 
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed. 
(3) No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service as an armed 
combatant. Details will be regulated by a Federal law. 
GG art. 4. 
 43. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (285), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 5 (“Die 
Religionsfreiheit der Beschwerdeführerin werde durch das Grundrecht auf negative 
Religionsfreiheit der Schülerinnen und Schüler, das Erziehungsrecht der Eltern aus Art. 6 
Abs. 2 GG sowie die Verpflichtung des Staates zu weltanschaulicher und religiöser Neutralität 
aber eingeschränkt.”). 
 44. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (285), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 6 (“Das 
religiös motivierte Tragen eines Kopftuchs durch eine Lehrerin stelle einen Eignungsmangel 
im Sinne des § 11 Abs. 1 Landesbeamtengesetz Baden-Württemberg (LBG) dar.”). 
 45. VGH Baden-Württemberg, NJW 54 (2001), 2899. 
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appellate court has limited powers of review in an administrative 
decision about whether an applicant is qualified for a job.46 
Nevertheless, the Court of Administrative Appeals highlighted the 
problem of allowing a teacher to wear a headscarf while teaching: 
“[w]earing a headscarf while teaching could influence the students 
religiously and could lead to conflicts within the affected 
classrooms.”47 The headscarf constituted a religious symbol “which 
the observer [in the school classroom] cannot avoid.”48 But Ludin 
was not satisfied with these justifications of the regulation 
prohibiting her from wearing a headscarf while teaching and 
appealed this decision of the Land Court of Administrative Appeals 
to the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin. 
Ludin was no more successful in the Federal Administrative 
Court than she had been in the courts below. The Federal 
Administrative Court in Berlin rejected Ludin’s complaint,49 
explaining that “[l]imitations [of an individual’s religious freedom] 
arise from the Basic Law itself, particularly from colliding 
fundamental rights of those who believe differently.”50 In fact, the 
religious freedom guaranteed by the Basic Law necessitates some 
such limitations, especially in the context of public schools in the 
name of the state’s mandated religious neutrality.51 In short, 
The right of the teacher to act according to her convictions must 
retreat from the competing religious freedom of the students and 
parents while teaching. Neither the requirement of toleration nor 
 46. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (286), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 8 
(summarizing the Baden-Württemberg Court of Administrative Appeals’s reasoning). 
 47. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (287), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 11 (“Das 
Tragen des Kopftuchs durch eine Lehrerin im Unterricht könne zu einer religiösen Beeinflussung 
der Schüler und zu Konflikten innerhalb der jeweiligen Schulklasse führen . . . .”). 
 48. Id. (“dem sich der Betrachter nicht entziehen könne”). 
 49. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], NJW 55 
(2002), 3344 (upholding the administrative prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf in 
public state schools). 
 50. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (288), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 13 
(“Einschränkungen ergäben sich aus der Verfassung selbst, insbesondere aus kollidierenden 
Grundrechten Andersdenkender.”). 
 51. Id. (“In dem vom Staat organisierten und gestalteten Lebensbereich der 
bekenntnisfreien Pflichtschule komme Art. 4 Abs. 1 GG freiheitssichernde Bedeutung 
vornehmlich zugunsten der schulpflichtigen Kinder und ihrer Eltern zu. . . . Kinder seien in 
öffentlichen Pflichtschulen ohne jegliche Parteinahme des Staates und der ihn 
repräsentierenden Lehrkräfte für christliche Bekenntnisse oder für andere religiöse und 
weltanschauliche Überzeugungen zu unterrichten und zu erziehen.”). 
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the principle of practical harmony compel the conclusion that the 
parent’s right to the upbringing of their children and the religious 
freedom of the parents and the children must be repressed in favor 
of a teacher who wears a headscarf.52
In response to these results in the administrative courts, Ludin 
entered a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court alleging 
that the administrative regulation of the SSA prohibiting her from 
wearing a headscarf while teaching violated her fundamental rights 
under the Basic Law.53 Unlike the administrative courts that 
uniformly rejected Ludin’s complaints, the Federal Constitutional 
Court ruled the prohibition as promulgated and implemented by the 
SSA legally insufficient54 to deprive Ludin of her religious freedom.55 
But this holding is infirm because of its lack of guidance and the 
political controversy it has aroused. 
B. The Majority Opinion in the German Headscarf Decision 
The Federal Constitutional Court found Ludin’s complaint that 
the school authorities and the administrative courts had violated her 
right to religious freedom to be valid. Accordingly, the court found 
that the statutory scheme in place in Baden-Württemberg’s existing 
laws did not provide a “sufficiently clear legal basis”56 upon which to 
use an administrative decision to prohibit wearing headscarves while 
teaching. Proceeding from article 33, paragraph 2 of the Basic 
Law—under which every German enjoys equal access to every public 
office according to his eligibility, ability, and professional 
qualifications—the court noted that this access to employment in the 
civil service can indeed be limited by subjective acceptance criteria, as 
provided, for example, in the Law on Guidelines for Employment in 
the Civil Service [Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz] and the Laws on State 
 52. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (289), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 14. 
 53. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (289), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 16. 
 54. See infra note 82 for a discussion of the principle that essential matters—such as the 
limitation of a fundamental right—are reserved to democratically elected legislatures that create 
the clear legal basis to guide any legislative delegation that results in the restriction of a 
fundamental right. 
 55. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 49. 
 56. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (294), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3111), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 30. 
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Civil Servants [Landesbeamtengesetzen].57 In setting these criteria, the 
lawmaker has wide discretion.58 According to the court, the exercise 
of a fundamental right, such as the right to freedom of religious 
expression, by a civil servant while at work can be limited by the 
general demands of the position or by special requirements of the 
public office in question.59 Even in the prognostic decision on the 
future official activities of someone applying for a position, the state 
as an employer still has wide discretion that can only be reviewed 
narrowly by the courts.60
But in the Headscarf Decision problems arose from article 4 of 
the Basic Law, whose scope in protecting religious freedom the court 
recapitulated based on earlier decisions. The religious freedom 
ubiquitously guaranteed by article 4 also encompasses the right to 
profess and to preach one’s faith61 and to base all of one’s behavior 
on the teachings of one’s religion. Religious convictions that dictate 
one behavior as the correct way to cope with circumstances are also 
protected by article 4.62 Because the article 4 rights of religious 
 57. The Court conceded that “[i]n principle, the lawmaker has wide discretion in 
setting eligibility criteria for a particular position in the civil service and in defining the job 
description against which to judge the qualifications of an applicant for that position.” 
Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (296), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3111), 2 BvR 
1436/02, para. 34 (“Der Gesetzgeber hat bei der Aufstellung von Eignungskriterien für das 
jeweilige Amt und bei der Ausgestaltung von Dienstpflichten, nach denen die Eignung von 
Bewerbern für den öffentlichen Dienst zu beurteilen ist, grundsätzlich eine weite 
Gestaltungsfreiheit.”). Compare Decision of May 22, 1975, BVerfGE 39, 334 (370) 
(upholding loyalty to the state as an eligibility requirement for employement in the civil 
service), with Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz [BRRG] [Law on Guidelines for Employment in 
the Civil Service] § 7, v. 31.3.1999 (Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Gazette] I S. 654), and 
Landesbeamtengesetz Baden-Württemberg [LBG] [Law on State Civil Servants Baden-
Württemberg] § 11, para. 1, v. 19.3.1996 (Gesetzblatt [Legal Gazette] S. 286). 
 58. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (296), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3111), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 34. 
 59. Id. (citing Decision of Feb. 25, 1981, BVerwGE 56, 227). 
 60. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (296), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 35; cf. Decision of May 27, 1992, BVerwGE 86, 244; Decision of Dec. 
18, 1984, BVerwGE 68, 109; Decision of Oct. 19, 1982, BVerwGE 61, 176 (186); Decision 
of May 22, 1975, BVerfGE 39, 334 (354) (holding that a court can only narrowly review 
eligibility for employment in the civil service decision by the state). 
 61. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 37; cf. Decision of Oct. 16, 1968, BVerfGE 24, 236 (245) (holding that 
article 4 of the Basic Law not only guarantees the freedom to have or not to have religious 
convictions but also the freedom to teach and spread such convictions). 
 62. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 37; cf. Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, BVerfGE 41, 29 (49) (reasoning that 
article 4 of the Basic Law not only prohibits the state from intruding into the area of an 
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freedom are guaranteed unconditionally,63 any limitations on these 
rights must also arise directly from the Basic Law.64 “In addition, the 
limitation of the unconditionally guaranteed freedom of religion 
requires a sufficiently clear legal basis.”65 Accordingly, any limitation 
of article 4 rights is subject to especially strict justification demands. 
The court considered wearing a headscarf to be a right protected 
by article 4’s guarantee of religious freedom. The court rightly 
supported its position on the subjective conviction of the 
complainant and not on the question of whether Islam generally and 
universally requires women to wear a headscarf.66 In any event, 
according to the court, it is enough if the obligation to wear a 
headscarf can plausibly fall under article 4.67 Incidentally, all earlier 
courts had also reached this conclusion in an unobjectionable way. 
As other constitutional rights that might potentially collide with the 
right to religious freedom, the court identified the state educational 
mandate,68 the parents’ right to upbringing,69 and the negative 
individual’s religious freedom but also requires positive action on the part of the state to allow 
for the active exercise of one’s convictions); Decision of April 11, 1972, BVerfGE 33, 23 (28) 
(stating that religious freedom guarantees more than just the freedom to believe or not to 
believe what one wishes—it also guarantees that right to orient one’s entire behavior to the 
tenets of one’s faith and to act according to one’s convictions); Decision of Oct. 19, 1971, 
BVerfGE 32, 98 (106) (noting that freedom of religion in Germany also protects religious 
convictions that determine a certain way to react to situations in life as the best way to 
overcome such circumstances even if the religion does not demand such behavior). 
 63. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 38. 
 64. Id.; cf. Decision of May 26, 1970, BVerfGE 28, 243 (260) (holding that limitations 
on the right to conscientious objection cannot be justified based merely on laws, norms, and 
institutions, but rather can only be justified on colliding fundamental rights of third parties); 
see also Crucifix Decision (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE 93, 1 (21) (same). 
 65. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 38 (citing Decision of Nov. 27, 1990, BVerfGE 83, 130 (142)). 
 66. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (298–99), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 40; see also Martin Heckel, Religionsfreiheit und Staatskirchenrecht in der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Religious Freedom and Church-State Law in the 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court], in 2 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 
FESTSCHRIFT 379, 393 (2001). 
 67. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (299), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 40. 
 68. GG art. 7, para. 1 (“The entire education system is under the supervision of the 
state.”). 
 69. GG art. 6, para. 2 (“Care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the 
parents and a duty primarily incumbent on them. The state watches over the performance of 
this duty.”). 
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religious freedom of the schoolchildren.70 But the court then applied 
the religion/worldview neutrality required of the state only to the 
state itself and not to representatives of the state—e.g., public school 
teachers—who parents and schoolchildren admittedly cannot choose 
themselves.71 The court straightforwardly explained that the 
necessary latitude for the active exercise of one’s religious convictions 
and the realization of one’s autonomous personality or individuality 
also belong under article 4’s protections:72  
The State singly may not exercise a conscious influence for the 
benefit of a specific political, ideological, or worldview perspective, 
or identify itself either expressly or impliedly with a particular faith 
or worldview through measures that either proceed from it or that 
are attributed to it and thereby endanger the religious peace in 
society.73  
Similarly, aside from the obligatory nature of public school, the court 
noted that, irrespective of their negative religious freedom, students 
and parents do not have the right to avoid confrontation with 
foreign confessions of faith, acts of worship, and religious symbols.74
The court recognized in detail the right of the Länder to create 
the public school system and to ban improper influences from 
schools. The religiously motivated clothing of a teacher, which also 
may be interpreted as a statement of a teacher’s religious convictions, 
could also have this effect, according to the court.75 With reference 
to the distinction used by the police between abstract and concrete 
danger, the court found that a teacher wearing a headscarf in an 
obligatory state school only entails an abstract danger—only the 
possibility of harm or a conflict. But the limitation of an 
 70. GG art. 4, para. 1 (“Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed 
religious or ideological, are inviolable.”); see also Crucifix Decision (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE 
93, 1 (4), (21–24) (ruling that Bavarian Land regulations requiring crucifixes to hang in 
classrooms in public schools violated students’ negative religious freedom, or the freedom not 
to adopt a certain belief). 
 71. See Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (299–300), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 
(3112–13), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 42–43. 
 72. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (300), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 43. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (301–02), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 46. 
 75. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 49. 
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unconditionally guaranteed fundamental right requires a sufficiently 
clear legal basis, which the court found missing in this case, in part 
apparently supported by this standard from the police of a lack of 
concrete danger posed by a teacher wearing a headscarf.76 That is, 
even though the applicant made clear from the beginning that she 
was not willing to comply with the headscarf prohibition, the court 
only found this to constitute an abstract possible danger which did 
not justify the current intrusion into this fundamental right.77 The 
court considered the fact that no tangible clues were visible to 
identify any concrete danger.78 Future conflicts will thus need other 
regulations.79 Furthermore, the teachers’ general obligations of 
restraint did not substantiate a policy prohibiting the wearing of 
certain clothing or other symbols at school.80 But the court found 
that the Land legislatures were free to provide the previously missing 
legal basis for such a prohibition by reevaluating, within the 
framework of the constitutional requirements, the allowable degree 
with which references to religion may appear in the school.81 This 
would put an applicant on notice (as they were already) that 
eligibility for employment in this field might be denied if the 
applicant reveals from the beginning that he or she cannot adopt the 
required restraint, for example, by not committing to refrain from 
wearing such symbols. 
The Federal Constitutional Court’s approach to the issue of 
teachers wearing an Islamic headscarf in public school is significantly 
flawed. Legally, the determining factor for the Federal Constitutional 
Court was that the question of eligibility for employment in the civil 
service cannot be decided by an administrative education authority 
familiar with the problem, although that has previously been the case 
with generally satisfactory results. The court held that the 
Wesentlichkeitstheorie, or “theory of essentiality,”82 demands that 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (308), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3115), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 60. 
 81. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (309), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3115), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 62. 
 82. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (312), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 69. The Wesentlichkeitstheorie is a principle of German constitutional and 
administrative law concerning the legality of administration. Two main principles govern the 
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democratically elected legislators issue these types of regulations 
because they have an assessment prerogative at their disposal, unlike 
administrators and judges.83 In fact, the court reasoned that agencies 
and courts could not claim such a prerogative for themselves.84 
Specifically, the court substantiated this position with the principles 
of parliamentary reservation of material issues [Parlamentsvorbehalt], 
the constitutional state founded on the rule of law 
[Rechtsstaatsprinzip],85 and the democratic imperative 
legality of administrative acts in the Federal Republic of Germany. First, the “priority of 
statute” [Vorrang des Gesetzes] “means that administrative decisions must never contravene 
statutes, since the latter have been passed by a democratically elected body. Thus 
administrative actions are bound by the law and must be fully reviewable by the courts.” 
NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 165 (3d ed. 2002).  
Second, the principle of “statutory reservation” [Vorbehalt des Gesetzes], which gives rise 
to the Wesentlichkeitstheorie, “requires a legal basis whenever the executive takes administrative 
action, especially when restricting the citizen’s basic rights but also when granting rights to the 
individual.” Id. Thus, “the principle of ‘statutory reservation’ goes beyond the first principle: 
The executive is not only prohibited from contravening existing legal provisions when acting. 
Rather, it needs a legal basis to act . . . . [This is because] all actions of the executive must be 
democratically justified and foreseeable by the citizen.” Id. In this context, the 
Wesentlichkeitstheorie is a rule created in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court 
“according to which essential matters have to be regulated by Parliament.” Id. The Court 
found this rule necessary to help distinguish between delegated legislation covered by the 
principle of statutory reservation and “parliamentary reservation” [Parlamentsvorbehalt]:  
[T]he more essential a matter is for the citizen and the public the more detailed 
Parliament’s regulation has to be on this matter, leaving less discretion to 
administrative decisions when implementing the statute. . . . [I]t has at least been 
generally accepted that matters which are of importance to the individual’s 
enjoyment of basic rights are “essential matters.” Therefore they must be decided 
upon by Parliament and cannot be left to delegated legislation. 
Id. at 165–66. 
 83. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (310), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 66. 
 84. Id.; cf. Decision of March 1, 1979, BVerfGE 50, 290 (332); Decision of March 2, 
1999, BVerfGE 99, 367 (389). 
 85. It is true that “[t]he principle of Rechtsstaat is often translated as rule of law,” 
however, “such a translation can be misleading.” FOSTER & SULE, supra note 82, at 163. That 
is, “[t]he term itself . . . indicates the supremacy of law (Recht) within the state (Staat)” which 
indeed at first closely resembles the essence of the “British rule of law.” Id. But the term 
Rechtsstaat also includes a substantive component missing in the British rule of law: “[T]he 
experiences of the Third Reich have shown that formal Acts of Parliament do not necessarily 
safeguard against blatantly unjust and inhumane measures taken by the state against 
individuals.” Id. For this reason, “the principle of Rechtsstaat now also includes a substantial 
element” which means that “state authorities such as [the] judiciary and the executive are not 
only bound by Acts of Parliament (Gesetz) but also [by] ‘the law’ (Recht) meaning ‘substantial 
rightness and justice’ as expressed by fundamental constitutional values, namely the basic 
rights.” Id. at 163–64.  
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[Demokratiegebot].86 In order to realize fundamental rights, the 
court held, the controlling regulations must be laid out in law.87 In 
any case, the lawgiver is committed to determine on its own the 
contours of conflicting guaranteed freedoms as far as such a 
determination is material for the exercise of these freedoms.88 The 
court noted that the power to limit fundamental freedoms and to 
balance colliding fundamental rights are powers reserved to the 
parliament under the Basic Law.89 This applies especially to schools, 
the court found, where the teachers’ obligations have previously not 
been sufficiently defined.90
The Headscarf Decision will result in further heated political 
arguments. Such controversy is even more likely since the court 
uncharacteristically failed to provide instruction as to what such a 
valid regulation should contain.91 The court might have made this 
omission because none of the numerous other courts (including the 
Federal Administrative Court) or the Land legislatures had treated 
the problem and the prevailing principle in the debate about these 
questions in quite this way before. One more problematic aspect of 
the court’s decision is that it does not grant an adequate transition 
period for the Länder to develop a new constitutionally sufficient 
legal basis for a headscarf prohibition.92 This has created a legal 
vacuum: between the day of the Decision and the forthcoming and 
possibly conflicting regulations currently being developed in the 
Länder, a public school teacher may not be prohibited from wearing 
 86. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (311), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 67. 
 87. Id. The democratic imperative [Demokratiegebot], the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, and the 
parliamentary reservation [Parlamentsvorbehalt] together “require that essential matters cannot 
be regulated by delegated legislation but have to be dealt with by Parliament itself.” FOSTER & 
SULE, supra note 82, at 196. See supra note 82 for a brief summary of the legality of 
administrative acts and the Wesentlichkeitstheorie. 
 88. Id.; cf. Decision of Nov. 27, 1990, BVerfGE 83, 130 (142). 
 89. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (312), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 68; cf. Decision of March 25, 1992, BVerfGE 85, 386 (403). 
 90. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (312), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 69. 
 91. See, e.g., Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302–03), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 
(3113–14), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 47 (noting merely that, in creating a sufficiently clear legal 
basis for a prohibition, a Land can consider certain factors such as the colliding rights at issue, 
the school tradition in that Land, and the denominational composition of the local population, 
but failing to list concrete criteria that would assure the validity of a new prohibition). 
 92. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (338), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121–22), 2 
BvR 1436/02, paras. 134–35 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
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a headscarf while teaching. Neither the case law nor the academic 
literature to date suggest that a civil servant’s official duties must be 
established by law if they relate to religious freedom, as noted by the 
sounder dissenting opinion. 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
Substantively, the dissenters in the Headscarf Decision 
emphasized the role a teacher plays as a representative of the state. In 
this context, the dissent notes the significance of the fact that 
“whoever wishes to become a civil servant freely chooses to side with 
the state.”93 Thus, “right from the beginning, teachers who are civil 
servants, by their status as civil servants, do not enjoy the same 
protection of their fundamental rights as do parents and 
schoolchildren. Rather, teachers are bound to fundamental rights 
because they take part in the exercise of public power.”94 The 
relationship of a teacher to the state is an exceptionally close one.95 
Still, the teacher in the capacity of teacher is not a mere “executive 
instrument” [Vollzugsinstrument] of the state by nature of this 
relationship.96 Nevertheless, 
[h]e who wishes to become a civil servant must nevertheless 
identify himself with the constitutional state in important 
fundamental questions and in the performance of his official 
responsibilities because the State is also represented by the official 
service of the teacher and therefore is identified with the actual 
individual so serving. All principles of the civil service are governed 
by this idea of mutuality and proximity.97
Essentially, the civil servant, properly understood, waives his or 
her constitutional rights that are not compatible with the position of 
 93. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (315), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 77 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (“Wer Beamter wird, 
stellt sich in freier Willensentschließung auf die Seite des Staates.”). 
 94. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 95. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (317), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 81 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 96. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 97. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (“Wer Beamter werden will, muss 
sich jedoch mit dem Verfassungsstaat in wichtigen Grundsatzfragen und bei der 
Wahrnehmung seiner dienstlichen Aufgaben loyal identifizieren, weil umgekehrt auch der Staat 
durch seinen öffentlichen Dienst repräsentiert und deshalb mit dem konkreten Bediensteten 
identifiziert wird. Von dieser Idee der Gegenseitigkeit und der Nähe sind alle Grundsätze des 
Berufsbeamtentums beherrscht.”). 
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civil service at issue—here, teachers in a public, obligatory state 
school. “The majority did not take sufficient account of this 
structural difference” between the relationship of a normal citizen to 
the state and that of a civil servant.98
The dissenting opinion also criticizes the court’s apparent 
equation of the eligibility determination in the framework of the 
special equality clause in article 33, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law—
which guarantees all citizens equal access to employment in the civil 
service—with state interference with religious freedom guaranteed by 
article 4, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law.99 The conflation of these two 
constitutional provisions is novel and cannot be allowed.100 In 
contrast, according to the dissent, the intrusion by the state into the 
sphere of normal citizens is normally a prerequisite for a claim that 
such classic rights and freedoms have been violated.101 But the 
dissent points out that, in the case of a civil servant job applicant in a 
public school (i.e., a teacher) the state is not intruding into the 
sphere of ordinary citizens; rather, a bearer of fundamental rights is 
seeking affiliation with the state apparatus and thus associates with 
the state, or the fundamental rights addressee 
[Grundrechtsadressaten].102 However, the dissent notes that a civil 
servant’s freedom while in service is limited from the beginning by 
the nature of the circumstances and, above all, by the constitutional 
form of the office.103
Finally, the dissent sharply criticizes another aspect of the court’s 
opinion that bears mention here as problematic. The dissent notes 
that the court seems to ignore clear constitutional mandates in 
finding that the regulatory prohibition on wearing a headscarf while 
teaching does not proceed from a “sufficiently clear legal basis”104 
 98. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (316), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 79 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 99. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (318–19), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117–
18), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 84–87 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 100. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (318), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3118), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 85 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 101. Cf. id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 102. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 103. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 104. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (306), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3115), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 57 (establishing that there was not a “sufficiently clear legal basis” for the 
administrative decision that Ludin was not qualified according to the eligibility criteria for 
employment in the civil service because of her continued refusal to teach without her 
headscarf). 
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and in finding that in order to prohibit teachers from wearing 
headscarves, the Länder needed to legislate and create a “sufficiently 
clear legal basis.”105 But the Basic Law itself provides the legal 
basis106 for a determination that a civil servant who categorically 
refuses to remove a headscarf while on the job does not meet the 
eligibility criteria for employment in the civil service.107 Thus, 
“[u]ncompromisingly insisting on wearing a headscarf while teaching 
in a public school, as the complainant has done, is not compatible 
with the [constitutional] imperative of moderation and neutrality 
required of a civil servant.”108
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FLAWED MAJORITY OPINION  
IN THE HEADSCARF DECISION 
A. Why the Court Got It Wrong 
At first glance, the Headscarf Decision seems to be doctrinally 
consistent with case law. Existing case law has long merited the 
approval of relevant academic literature. The Decision confirms, in 
the first place, previous arguments in case law109 and literature for 
religious/worldview neutrality in the sense of openness and 
promotion110—in contrast to the French type of exclusionary laicism, 
or secularization, that is not and should not be valid in Germany.111 
In the Headscarf Decision, the court has reemphasized the legal 
equality of all religions and worldviews, but has also indicated that 
not every kind of behavior of an individual, as subjectively 
 105. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (320), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3118), 2 
BvR 1436/02, paras. 90–91 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 106. GG art. 33, para. 2; see also Decision of Feb. 21, 1995, BVerfGE 92, 140 (151); 
Decision of July 8, 1997, BVerfGE 96, 189 (197). 
 107. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (320, 323–25), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 
(3118–19), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 90, 97–101 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 108. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (325), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3119), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 102 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 109. Compare Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297–300), NJW 56 (2003), 
3111 (3112–13), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 37–42, with Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, BVerfGE 
41, 29 (49); Decision of April 11, 1972, BVerfGE 33, 23 (28); Decision of Oct. 19, 1971, 
BVerfGE 32, 98 (106). 
 110. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (299–300), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112–
13), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 42. 
 111. See infra text accompanying notes 149–71 for a discussion of the French approach 
to religious neutrality and why Germany should not ascribe to it. 
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interpreted by that individual to be an expression of protected 
religious freedom, can be seen as such.112 The court demands 
plausibility in order to find any given behavior within the protected 
realm of freedom of religion and conscience.113 But despite 
appearance to the contrary, the Headscarf Decision leaves a 
conflicting impression in many ways. 
1. Deciding not to decide 
The court conspicuously avoids taking a position on a religious 
question in the Decision by returning the issue to the Land 
legislatures.114 This is reminiscent of two recent reactions by the 
court to questions of religious freedom. First, the court avoided 
adjudicating the merits of such a question in the case concerning the 
Land of Brandenburg’s worldview and ethics course known as 
LER.115 In the LER case, the Land Brandenburg was accused of 
violating the state’s obligation to religious/worldview neutrality 
because the “religious sciences” [Religionskunde] aspect of the LER 
curriculum was considered generally hostile toward religion.116 The 
LER case ended with a court-suggested settlement after the court 
granted the Land five years to dismantle its controversial position, 
thus never proceeding to a judgment on the merits.117 Second, the 
court’s Kosher Butcher Decision118 concerned a prohibition on 
slaughtering animals without anesthesia for religious reasons. In the 
Kosher Butcher Decision, the court simply passed the problem of 
 112. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (298), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 40 (“nicht jegliches Verhalten einer Person allein nach deren subjektiver 
Bestimmung als Ausdruck der besonderen geschützten Glaubensfreiheit angesehen werden 
könne”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302–03, 309), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 
(3113, 3115), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 47 & 62–63. 
 115. “Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde” [Life Orientation–Ethics–Religious Sciences]. 
See generally LER Decision (Oct. 31, 2002), BVerfGE 106, 210; Hans Marcus Heimann, 
Ethikunterricht im religiös und weltanschaulich neutralen Staat [Ethics Lessons in a 
Religious/Worldview Neutral State], ZEVKR 48 (2003), 17.  
 116. Heimann, supra note 115, at 17. 
 117. Id. at 17 n.1. 
 118. Schächt-Urteil [Kosher Butcher Decision] (Jan. 15, 2002), BVerfGE 104, 337; see 
also Nina Arndt & Michael Droege, Das Schächturteil des BVerfG—Ein „Dritter Weg” im 
Umgang mit der Religionsausübungsfreiheit [The Kosher Butcher Decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court—A “Third Way” in the Interaction with the Free Exercise of Religion], 
ZEVKR 48 (2003), 188. 
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protecting animal welfare on to the Executive, which the court 
charged to ensure that animal welfare interests be observed in 
individual cases “through side determinations and by supervision of 
their observance as well as through examination of expert studies and 
the personal qualification of the claimant also in relation to the 
particular skills required for kosher butchering.”119 The court 
proceeded in a similar responsibility-shifting fashion in the Headscarf 
Decision. 
There has apparently never been an attempt to challenge the 
constitutional protection of wearing a headscarf for religious reasons 
under the protections of the free exercise of religion. Even civil 
servants are permitted to wear headscarves in public while not 
working. The only point of contention is whether this freedom is 
restricted while engaged in the civil service. To this extent, the 
Headscarf Decision offers little new insight. As expressed by the 
dissenting opinion, “[t]he court has failed its duty to answer a basic 
constitutional question even though that case was justiciable.”120 The 
German news magazine Der Spiegel formulated it much more 
concisely: the court has unfortunately “decided not to decide.”121
2. Contradicting prior case law and departing from foundational 
principles 
In addition to shifting responsibility, the Headscarf Decision also 
contradicts prior case law. The court has previously emphasized the 
primacy of protecting children and teenagers from various dangers to 
their development.122 It was in this vein that the court issued its 
Crucifix Decision.123 This line of reasoning played no part in the 
 119. Id. at 348 (“durch Nebenbestimmungen und die Überwachung ihrer Einhaltung 
ebenso wie bei der Prüfung der Sachkunde und der persönlichen Eignung des Antragstellers 
auch in Bezug auf die besonderen Fertigkeiten des Schächtens”); see also Karl-Hermann 
Kästner, Das tierschutzrechtliche Verbot des Schächtens aus der Sicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
[The Animal Welfare Prohibition on Kosher Butchering from the Perspective of the Federal 
Constitutional Court], JZ 57 (2002), 491. 
 120. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (337), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 133 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (“Der Aufgabe, eine 
verfassungsrechtliche Grundsatzfrage zu beantworten, ist der Senat nicht gerecht geworden, 
obwohl der Fall entscheidungsreif ist.”). 
 121. Dominik Cziesche et al., Das Kreuz mit dem Koran [The Cross with the Qur’an], 
DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 29, 2003, at 82. 
 122. Decision of Nov. 27, 1990, BVerfGE 83, 130 (140). 
 123. Crucifix Decision (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE 93, 1. 
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Headscarf Decision. But a piece of clothing conspicuously displayed 
by a teacher for religious reasons arguably makes a bigger impression 
than does the familiar symbol of a cross or crucifix. A crucifix or 
cross typically hangs on the wall with no missionary intentions, 
hanging instead as a simple “trademark” of a constitutionally 
permitted type of school.124 Even though the cross does not appear 
in certain schools for religious reasons, but rather may appear as a 
cultural symbol and trademark of a type of school and its curriculum, 
the court unduly complicated “learning under the cross”125 in the 
Crucifix Decision. 
Wearing a headscarf, by contrast, is seen in the Headscarf 
Decision as possibly meaning something very different,126 even 
though no one doubts that the teacher in this case wore a headscarf 
as a manifestation of her religious convictions. Additionally, the 
court does not discuss the perception horizon of the children at the 
developmental age who are obligated to go to school. Quoting itself, 
the court notes that, in a society that gives room to different 
religious convictions, there is no right “to be spared contact with 
different religious statements, rites, and symbols,”127 but then leaves 
the actual problem unsolved. This is not about people being exposed 
to religious impressions on the street, but rather it concerns “a 
situation created by the state in which the individual is exposed to 
the influence of a specific faith, to the actions in which this faith 
manifests itself, and to the symbols in which this faith is 
represented.”128 It is surprising that the court does not discuss 
further the extent to which the state can legally force parents to 
 124. Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, Offene Fragen im Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche 
am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts [Open Questions in the Relationship Between Church and State at 
the End of the Twentieth Century], ESSGESPR. 34 (2000), 105, 110. 
 125. See Karl-Hermann Kästner, Lernen unter dem Kreuz? Zur Zulässigkeit religiöser 
Symbole in staatlichen Schulen nach der Entscheidung des BVerfG vom 16. Mai 1995 [Learning 
Under the Cross? On the Permissibility of Religious Symbols in Schools After the Decision of the 
Federal Constitutional Court of May 16, 1995], ZEVKR 41 (1996), 242. 
 126. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303–05), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2 
BvR 1436/02, paras. 50–52. 
 127. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 46 (“von fremden Glaubensbekundungen, kultischen Handlungen und 
religiösen Symbolen verschont zu bleiben”); see also Crucifix Decision, BVerfGE 93, 1, 15. 
 128. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113–14), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 46 (“eine vom Staate geschaffene Lage, in welcher der Einzelne ohne 
Ausweichmöglichkeit dem Einfluss eines bestimmten Glaubens, den Handlungen, in denen 
dieser sich manifestiert, und den Symbolen, in denen er sich darstellt, ausgesetzt ist”). 
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expose children to a religious influence conveyed by a headscarf by 
means of general compulsory education. 
Finally, the foundational principles regarding the legal position 
of civil servants are completely repealed with this Decision. The 
relationship between article 33, paragraph 3 and article 4, paragraphs 
1 and 2 of the Basic Law, the applicability of fundamental rights to 
the law governing civil servants, determinations of qualification, and 
eligibility for employment in the civil service according to article 33, 
paragraph 3 of the Basic Law are all abolished with the comment 
that fundamental rights are of ultimate importance.129
3. Catering to politics and special interests 
Fundamental political decisions are also at play in this Decision, 
and these must be dissimulated. It is not the case that three or five 
percent of the population of Germany is Muslim; rather, in some 
parts of Germany that number is sixty or ninety percent.130 Behind 
these Muslims, as behind the claimant teacher in the Headscarf 
Decision, stand powerful special interest groups that have expressed 
their desire to change society.131 Allowing teachers to wear 
headscarves will not be the end of it; these special interest groups will 
only stop once they have effected change in all social institutions: 
state registrars, judges, and policewomen, all who insist on wearing 
headscarves, and even possibly policemen with turbans. These are the 
problems that lurk in the background. In this respect, this Decision 
is not helpful but ominous. To this extent, one must also question 
the comments about neutrality in the Decision. The objective effect 
of this Decision is that the state appears to identify itself with the 
teacher who functions by mandate of the state and in its name not 
only in the content and nature of the lessons that she teaches, but 
also in the striking potential effect of her religiously toned clothing. 
We do not need to decide what to do with nuns and monks who are 
so often and gladly mentioned in this context because they uniformly 
appear in their respective manner of dress in private parochial 
schools; otherwise we would have had corresponding cases and 
 129. Cf. Böckenförde, supra note 28 (employing the same logic as the Federal 
Constitutional Court in a discussion of the Decision of Oct. 16, 2000, in the Administrative 
Trial Court of Lüneburg, NJW 54 (2001), 767). 
 130. BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 14/4530, at 9. 
 131. Id. at 66. 
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treatments in the relevant academic literature decades ago in 
Germany.132 Under these circumstances, it is even perplexing that the 
majority opinion in the Headscarf Decision speaks only generally 
about a “piece of clothing” [Kleidungsstück] and compares this with 
a simple Christian or Muslim piece of jewelry on a necklace. In this 
respect, the court surpasses even France’s laïcité,133 which exempts 
normal pieces of jewelry that are not ostentatiously large from the 
prohibition of religious symbols at school. 
B. Why the Dissent Got It Right 
In accord with the dissenting opinion,134 it is crucial to 
distinguish between citizens who are subject by law to compulsory 
education in public schools on the one hand, and applicants for 
positions as teachers who have voluntarily chosen to become part of 
the state apparatus as civil servants in those state schools, on the 
other. Previously—and irrespective of differing legal rationales—it 
was undisputed that a civil servant could not rely to the same extent 
on the effect of fundamental rights that guarantee freedom as could 
the normal citizen.135 A citizen’s fundamental rights are directed 
against the state, and the school teacher, as part of the state 
apparatus, is a primary addressee of that citizen’s fundamental rights. 
Naturally, the teacher also has fundamental rights. The teacher’s 
rights are not dismissed out of hand. But they experience a limitation 
in the interest of the civil servant’s position; the extent of the 
limitation depends on the nature of the office in question. Teachers 
carry their own pedagogical responsibility, not in the cognition of 
their own freedom, but rather on behalf of the state and under its 
control. The dissenting opinion expresses this idea. 
The Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court does not 
dispute this in any way. The court merely explains that the 
formulation of the duties of civil servants cannot be substantiated by 
state administrative channels, as has previously been the case. The 
actual loser in this Decision, therefore, is the state administration. 
 132. See generally ERWIN FISCHER, VOLKSKIRCHE ADE! TRENNUNG VON STAAT UND 
KIRCHE [VOLKSKIRCHE ADE! THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE] (4th ed. 1993). 
 133. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of French secular humanism, or laïcité. 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 93–108. 
 135. See, e.g., Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, BVerfGE 47, 46; Decision of June 22, 1977, 
BVerfGE 45, 400; Decision of Jan. 27, 1976, BVerfGE 41, 251; Decision of Dec. 6, 1972, 
BVerfGE 34, 165. 
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The court is demanding a shift of importance from the executive to 
the legislative branch.136 The court does not dispute that the state 
regulates the uniform loyalty to the law and the constitution of the 
administration with the duties of civil servants in the domestic 
sphere. The only question is how far the state regulation must go; 
that is, how much discretion does the hiring official in the field have? 
The scope of civil servants’ fundamental rights has been 
hammered out in the debate surrounding what has previously been 
termed “special relationships of power” [Besondere 
Gewaltverhältnisse]. But the term “special relationship of power” 
became uncommon in constitutional jurisprudence because a relation 
of power can be associated with a contradiction to a relationship of 
law [Rechtsverhältnis].137 That is why other terms became 
common—without harming the substantive meaning—such as 
“special relationships of law” [Sonderrechtsverhältnisse], “special 
connection” [Sonderbindung], “heightened relationship of 
dependence” [gesteigertes Abhängigkeitsverhältnis], “special 
relationship of duties” [besonderes Pflichtenverhältnis], and “special 
status” [Sonderstatus]. All of these terms still describe relationships of 
law “that are characterized by an especially close connection of the 
individual who stands in such a position through state power.”138 
The relationship of the civil servant and the school always appears 
next to the relationship of the soldier and of the prisoner to the state 
in this context of special relationships that might affect the 
fundamental rights of those involved in the relationships. 
Undoubtedly, fundamental rights are still valid even in these 
special relationships.139 But the nature of their validity constitutes a 
 136. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (336), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121), 2 
BvR 1436/02, para. 131 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting). 
 137. Wolfgang Loschelder, Grundrechte im Sonderstatus [Fundamental Rights in the 
Special Status], 5 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF STATE LAW] § 123 n.6 
(1992); see also KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] marginal no. 321 (20th ed. 1995). 
 138. 1 INGO VON MÜNCH, GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR [COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC 
LAW] Vorb. arts. 1–19, marginal no. 59 (5th ed. 2000); see also CHRISTIAN STARCK, in 1 
GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR [COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC LAW] art. 1, marginal no. 255 
(Von Mangoldt et al. eds., 4th ed. 1999). 
 139. See Loschelder, supra note 137, § 123 n.6; see also HESSE, supra note 137, at 
marginal no. 321. Older legal perspectives were overcome especially in the jurisprudence of the 
Federal Constitutional Court. See, e.g., Strafgefangenen-Entscheidung [Prisoner Decision] 
(Mar. 14, 1972), BVerfGE 33, 1. For expressions of this change in the area of public schools, 
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legal problem. Here we are obviously dealing with legal relationships 
that demand a special type of protection of freedom since their 
nature differs from the general relationship of citizens to the state. It 
would exceed the comprehensive legal bounds of state power if 
fundamental rights could be restricted arbitrarily or by discretion in 
such relationships of special status. Therefore, in the words of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, even in such special relationships, a 
restriction of fundamental rights may be considered 
only if the restriction is indispensable for the achievement of the 
community oriented goals covered by the value regime of the Basic 
Law and in constitutional forms provided for there. . . . Thus, it 
may only occur through a law or on the basis of a law . . . , which 
will, however, not be able to dispense with blanket clauses that are 
as narrowly tailored as possible.140
Examples of such “constitutional forms” provided for in the 
Basic Law for justifying restrictions of fundamental rights within 
these special relationships include constitutional determinations for 
the military,141 for the establishment of the civil service,142 for the 
see Decision of Oct. 20, 1981, BVerfGE 58, 257; Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, BVerfGE 47, 
46; Decision of June 22, 1977, BVerfGE 45, 400; Decision of Jan. 27, 1976, BVerfGE 41, 
251; Decision of Dec. 6, 1972, BVerfGE 34, 165. 
 140. Prisoner Decision, BVerfGE 33, 1 (11) (“nur dann in Betracht, wenn sie zur 
Erreichung eines von der Wertordnung des Grundgesetzes gedeckten gemeinschaftsbezogenen 
Zweckes unerläßlich ist und in den dafür verfassungsrechtlich vorgesehenen Formen 
geschieht. . . . also nur durch Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes . . . , das allerdings auf—
möglichst eng begrenzte—Generalklauseln nicht wird verzichten können”). 
 141. GG art. 17a. This article provides: 
(1) Laws concerning military services and alternative service may by provisions 
applying to members of the Armed Forces and of alternative services during their 
period of military or alternative service, restrict the basic right freely to express and 
to disseminate opinions by speech, writing, and pictures (Article 5, paragraph (1) 
first half-sentence), the basic right of assembly (Article 9), and the right of petition 
(Article 17) insofar as it permits to address requests or complaints jointly with 
others. 
(2) Laws for defense purposes, including the protection of the civilian population 
may provide for the restriction of the basic rights of freedom of movement (Article 
11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13). 
 142.  GG art. 33, paras. 4–5. These paragraphs determine that 
(4) The exercise of state authority as a permanent function shall as a rule be 
entrusted to members of the public service whose status, service and loyalty are 
governed by public law. 
(5) The law of the public service shall be regulated with due regard to the traditional 
principles of the permanent civil service. 
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public school system,143 and for the penal system.144 Thus, the scope 
of fundamental rights is restricted by general rules in these “state 
internal areas” [staatlichen Innenbereichen] of particular obligation. 
Naturally, the restriction will conform to the characteristics of the 
particular state-organized sphere. 
Case law has deepened the legal questions surrounding the 
relationships of special status. Until recently, many have taken for 
granted that only “material” questions regarding these relationships 
should be reserved for the legislature.145 Certain specific duties are 
circumscribed by these general rules even in civil service and 
education law. However, details about the specific duties necessarily 
rest with administrative bodies. 
The headscarf conflict repeats this debate about what role the 
legislature plays in this context, and the court has apparently 
assumed the equality of the fundamental rights of civil servants, on 
the one hand, and of citizens who are subject to state compulsion 
143.  GG art. 7. This article concerns the State’s role in education in Germany: 
(1) The entire education system is under the supervision of the state. 
(2) The persons entitled to bring up a child have the right to decide whether they 
shall receive religious instruction. 
(3) Religious instruction forms part of the ordinary curriculum in state and 
municipal schools, excepting secular schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right 
of supervision, religious instruction is given in accordance with the tenets of the 
religious communities. No teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious 
instruction. 
(4) The right to establish private schools is guaranteed. Private schools as a 
substitute for state or municipal schools, require the approval of the state and are 
subject to the laws of the Laender. This approval must be given if private schools are 
not inferior to the state or municipal schools in their educational aims, their facilities 
and the professional training of their teaching staff, and if a segregation of the pupils 
according to the means of the parents is not promoted. This approval must be 
withheld if the economic and legal position of the teaching staff is not sufficiently 
assured. 
(5) A private elementary school shall be admitted only if the educational authority 
finds that it serves a special pedagogic interest or if, on the application of persons 
entitled to bring up children, it is to be established as an interdenominational or 
denominational or ideological school and a state or municipal elementary school of 
this type does not exist in the community. 
(6) Preparatory schools remain abolished. 
 144. GG art. 74, no. 1 (“Concurrent legislative powers extend to the following matters: 
1. civil law, criminal law and execution of sentences, the system of judicature, the procedure of 
the courts, the legal profession, notaries and legal advice . . . .”). 
 145. Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, BVerfGE 47, 46 (78–79); Decision of June 22, 1977, 
BVerfGE 45, 400 (417); Decision of Jan. 27, 1976, BVerfGE 41, 251 (259); Decision of Dec. 
6, 1972, BVerfGE 34, 165 (192). 
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(students in obligatory schools, prisoners in the penal system, 
etc.),146 on the other. It seems to me that rather than equating the 
fundamental rights of these two, the court should have counted 
teachers as representatives of those owing fundamental rights and 
not as those who possess claims for freedom that are generally 
directed against the state. I also question whether it is helpful in a 
system such as the public school system to reserve material questions 
of education law to the legislature under the theory of essentiality 
[Wesentlichkeitstheorie].147 The result will be a de facto limitation of 
the freedom of those subject to state compulsion in these areas and 
for whose benefit the theory of essentiality—the legal reservation of 
material questions to the legislature—has been expanded into 
education law. It has the effect of making obligatory state schools 
available to teachers as a stage on which they can develop their 
personalities through constitutionally protected fundamental rights, 
independent of the democratically determined school system. 
German schools have not experienced problems in this area before; 
contrary to many of its neighbors, Germany enjoys peace at 
school.148 
IV. HEADSCARVES IN FRANCE 
Understandably, an investigation of the headscarf debate shifts 
from Germany to France.149 The headscarf has been the cause of 
disturbance and controversy in the public schools in France for 
approximately the last twenty years. And as recently as February 10, 
2004, a so-called laïcité law has passed the National Assembly in its 
first reading. It might seem at first blush that Germany could profit 
 146. For a general treatment, see Böckenförde, supra note 28. 
 147. For a discussion of the Wesentlichkeitstheorie, or the “theory of essentiality,” see 
supra note 82 and sources cited there. 
 148. Compare infra Part IV for a treatment of the situation in France. 
 149. See Werner Heun, Die Religionsfreiheit in Frankreich [Religious Freedom in France], 
ZEVKR 49 (2004), 273; cf. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, Staat und Kirche in Frankreich 
[Church and State in France], in STAAT UND KIRCHE IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 
[CHURCH AND STATE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION] 127 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1995); René 
Metz, Staat und Kirche in Frankreich. Auswirkungen des Trennungssystems—neuere 
Entwicklungstendenzen [Church and State in France. Effects of the System of Separation—New 
Developmental Trends], ESSGESPR. 6 (1972), 103. See generally AXEL FRHR. VON 
CAMPENHAUSEN, STAAT UND KIRCHE IN FRANKREICH [CHURCH AND STATE IN FRANCE] 
(1962), also published in French as L’ÉGLISE ET L’ÉTAT EN FRANCE (1964). 
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from the experiences in France. But this is not so since the systems 
differ so widely from each other.150
A. Background to France’s Approach to the Headscarf Problem 
According to its Constitution of 1958, the French Republic is a 
secular republic, “une République . . . laïque.” A radical separation 
of church and state has prevailed for the last one hundred years in 
France.151 The reasons for this stem from an understanding of the 
laicism, or the secularism, that banished religion from the public 
sphere and state institutions, especially from the public schools, and 
that prescribed ignoring religion and oppressing its expression.152 
While religious freedom reigns in Germany and every individual has 
the right “to orient his whole bearing on the teachings of his faith 
and to act according to his inward and outward faith and 
convictions,”153 French law relegates the exercise of religion to the 
private sphere. Accordingly, even Muslim schoolchildren in France 
have been forbidden to express their religious conviction as 
adherents of Islam by wearing a headscarf. 
It is difficult to understand this radically different state of affairs 
between Germany and France without some historical insight.154 
Ultra-Catholic and anticlerical excesses had ruptured French society 
since the French Revolution.155 The separation law of December 9, 
1905,156 was meant to take care of this poisoning conflict once and 
for all by forbidding any sort of recognition or support of churches 
 150. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 393–407. 
 151. See generally Von CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 149. 
 152. Id. at 86–113. 
 153. Decision of Oct. 19, 1971, BVerfGE 32, 98 (106) (“sein gesamtes Verhalten an den 
Lehren seines Glaubens auszurichten und seiner inneren und äußeren Glaubensüberzeugung 
gemäß zu handeln”); see also Decision of Oct. 16, 1968, BVerfGE 24, 236 (246). 
 154. See generally VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 
393–407. See also the recent sources listed in Heun, supra note 149. 
 155. CULTURE WARS. SECULAR-CLERICAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
EUROPE (Christopher Clark & Wolfram Kaiser eds., 2003); STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE RISE 
OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (1996); HUGH MCLEOD, RELIGION AND THE 
PEOPLE OF WESTERN EUROPE 1789–1989 (1997). 
 156. Loi du 9 décembre 1905 [Law of Dec. 9, 1905], C. adm. 787 (Fr.) (23rd ed. 1994) 
[hereinafter Law of 1905], reprinted in German in GIACOMETTI, QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE 
DER TRENNUNG VON KIRCHE UND STAAT [SOURCES ON THE HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION 
OF CHURCH AND STATE] 272 (1926); see also Hanna Clayson Smith, Comment, Liberté, 
Egalité, et Fraternité at Risk for New Religious Movements in France, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1099, 
1106–08 (introducing the Law of 1905). 
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by the state and by declaring anything religious to be a private 
matter.157 This approach overlooked the fact that, while the state and 
church institutions can indeed be totally separated, this does not 
work for people because an individual can be both a citizen and a 
member of a religion.158 Even the external disentanglement 
produced unanticipated problems. For example, the cathedrals and 
churches nationalized during the French Revolution are still owned 
by the state even today. They are carried by the state but used by the 
Catholic Church.159 Should they be closed? This was actually 
threatened at one point.160 This and many other repugnant 
developments were gradually curbed by thoughtful adjudication, 
especially by the Conseil d’État.161 The principle of radical laicism, or 
secularization, transformed into the more moderate principle of 
laïcité,162 which in many respects corresponds to the concept of 
neutrality in matters of religion and worldview. 
The present situation in France is livable, since legal or merely 
factual breaches of the hallowed state-separation principle have 
mitigated its restrictions on religious freedom. Such breaches of the 
strict principle include, among other things, public schools granting 
one free day per week for the purpose of making it possible for 
students to obtain religious education outside of school. The 
situation has also been relaxed by the emigration of a large portion 
of society out of the public schools and into private, state-subsidized 
parochial schools. This accords with the modern understanding of 
religious freedom but not with the secularization principles of the 
 157. Metz, supra note 149, at 103. 
 158. Id. 
 159. For this reason, the financing prohibition contained in the Law of 1905 could not 
be complied with in the manner prescribed in the law from the very beginning. Further 
ruptures have come in the course of the last ninety-nine years. See A. BOYER, LE DROIT DES 
RELIGIONS EN FRANCE [THE RIGHT OF RELIGIONS IN FRANCE] 126 (1993); Basdevant-
Gaudemet, supra note 149, at 141. 
 160. The closing of these churches was prevented at the last minute by the Law of Jan. 2, 
1907, which hardly revealed that something substantive was being revised. See VON 
CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 149, at 7–9. 
 161. Id. at 116. 
 162. For a succinct definition of laïcité, see Smith, supra note 156, at 1102 n.11 
(“Translated literally from the French, laïcité means ‘secularism.’ Others have translated laïcité 
to mean the French idea of ‘secular humanism,’ which embodies a set of political, 
philosophical, and, often, antireligious principles.” (citations omitted)); see also Jean Baubérot, 
Secularism and French Religious Liberty: A Sociological and Historical View, 2003 BYU L. REV. 
451; Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV. 637. 
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separation law of 1905, which have never been abrogated.163 Rather, 
these principles live on latently in French society. Thus, laicism, or 
secularization, continues to pose a threat as an exclusionary principle 
that curtails religious freedom.164
Jacques Chirac, the French President, clearly demonstrated the 
potential threat of France’s latent laicism in his speech of December 
17, 2003. In the name of toleration and religious freedom, President 
Chirac rose up the standard of laïcité and demanded respect for it.165 
In doing so, he did not appeal to what Germans refer to as the 
religious/worldview neutrality [die religiös-weltanschauliche 
Neutralität] of the schools; rather, he plead for a conception of 
public schools as a type of republican taboo zone, a “sanctuary”166 
from which anything religious should be completely banned. 
In this context, the new direction of recent French legislation 
belongs in the gestalt of the so-called laïcité law. Previously, the 
French legislature had hid behind the Conseil d’État, France’s 
preenforcement constitutional court. But the Conseil d’État has 
emphasized the principle of religious freedom and has only 
disallowed the wearing of headscarves in public school buildings 
when accompanied by provocative behavior.167 Schoolmasters had 
been given broad discretion to decide individual cases as they came 
up.168 But the pressure of militant Islamic organizations and the 
threat of Islamicization have caused headmasters to shrink from the 
responsibility of suspending such students from school. It is on this 
background that the French are creating this new laïcité law. 
B. Germany Should Not Take the French Approach 
The legal situations in France and Germany are fundamentally 
different. In Germany, which in comparison to other European 
 163. See Metz, supra note 149, at 142–43. 
 164. See VON CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 149, at 156; Heun, supra note 149, at 283; 
Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, „Laizismus,” in 1 EVANGELISCHES STAATSLEXIKON col. 1951 
(3d ed. 1987). 
 165. See Respekt der Laizität [Respect Laïcité], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 
FRANKFURT GENERAL NEWSPAPER], Jan. 29, 2004. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Theodore Dalrymple, France’s Headscarf Problem, CITY J., Apr. 23, 2003, at 
http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon_4_23_o3td.html.  
 168. Nicht überall ein Konfliktstoff [Not Everywhere Material for Conflict], SPIEGEL 
ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,266948, 
00.html (on file with the BYU Law Review). 
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countries has long been a model country in the field of religious 
freedom,169 such mismatched fragments from the French experience 
cannot be simply adopted, especially since France espouses a more 
limited concept of religious freedom.170 The separation of church 
and state—that is, the autonomy and independence of state and 
church institutions—has thrived in Germany since 1919. In 
Germany, both church and state work together to further the 
citizens’ interest in matters that intersect the responsibilities of both 
institutions. This was prescribed by the Weimar Constitution of 
1919 as much as it is by the Basic Law of today.171 Furthermore, the 
German prohibition on teachers wearing headscarves underscores the 
religious/worldview neutrality of the state—in this instance in the 
form of a teacher as the representative of the state school authority. 
France, on the contrary, is regulating the apparel of the 
schoolchildren and engaging in semantic subtleties to differentiate 
between jewelry and other adornments that are to be either allowed 
or disallowed in the future. It should not go that far in Germany. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Land legislatures, which want to secure peace in their 
respective Länder by maintaining the status quo of not allowing 
teachers to wear headscarves, are not to be envied in their task. In 
contrast to other decisions, the court here provides no criteria by 
which a legislature may correctly enact a prohibition after striking 
down the administrative regulation employed by the state of Baden-
Württemberg as insufficient to create a sufficient legal basis.172 New 
problems will also arise from the demand for concretization of 
 169. AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, 6 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [HANBOOK OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] § 136, marginal n. 6 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 
unrevised 2d ed. 2001). 
 170. Heun, supra note 149, at 273, 276–79. 
 171. Christoph Link, Ein Dreivierteljahrhundert Trennung von Kirche und Staat in 
Deutschland [Three-Quarters of a Century of the Separation of Church and State in Germany], 
in FS THIEME 98 (1993). For a discussion of the principle differences in the systems of 
separation in France, the United States, the former eastern bloc, and Germany, see VON 
CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 393–407. See generally Axel 
Frhr. von Campenhausen, Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche in Deutschland und das 
kirchliche Selbstbestimmungsrecht [The Separation of Church and State in Germany and the 
Churchs’ Right of Self Determination], ZEVKR 47 (2002), 359–68. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 91–92. 
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constitutional limitations in new laws.173 In the interest of equality, 
the different branches of the administrative state must be provided 
with specific regulations as well. Restrictions on religious freedom 
that are necessary in the civil service will then have to be weighed 
against the individual’s claim to fundamental rights. The equality 
issue sharpens the problem “because the legislative branch will have 
to develop consistent substantive distinguishing criteria for specific 
provisions that will need to include certain branches of the civil 
service, for example teachers, differently than other civil servants.”174
Thus, it is true that a treatment providing a satisfactory result for 
problematic cases always becomes more complicated in the future. 
Previously, the administrative apparatus has been charged with 
determining the legal qualification and eligibility of applicants for 
positions in the civil service. It is unclear how a legislature—which is 
now required to formulate generally applicable and abstract 
regulations on the eligibility of civil servants for employment by the 
state—can be expected to do a better job of it. “An increase in legal 
certainty and equity in individual cases can hardly result from this 
Decision.”175
 173. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (336–37), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 
(3121), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 131 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (criticizing 
the majority for demanding the Länder to legislate in an area in which they explicitly did not 
want to legislate and that the new law must “concretize constitutional limitations” without 
giving any criteria by which to do so). 
 174. Karl-Hermann Kästner, Darf eine muslimische Lehrerin im Unterricht das Kopftuch 
tragen? Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 24.9.2003 [May a Muslim Schoolteacher Wear a 
Headscarf While Teaching? Commentary on the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Sept. 24, 2003], JZ 58 (2003), 1178 (1180) (“denn die Legislative muss für spezifische 
Vorschriften, welche einzelne Zweige des öffentlichen Dienstes, wie beispielsweise die 
Lehrerschaft, anders erfassen sollen, als sonstige öffentliche Bedienstete, konsistente sachliche 
Differenzierungskriterien entwickeln”). 
 175. Id. (“Ein Zuwachs an Rechtssicherheit und Einzelfallgerechtigkeit dürfte sich 
hierdurch schwerlich ergeben.”). 
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